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Abstract 
The transnational character of maritime insecurity has made trans-border cooperation a sine qua non in the 
mitigation of illicit maritime activities the world over. The resource-laden Gulf of Guinea region has remained 
largely under-utilized due to the high incidence of piracy, sea banditry and other associated crimes within the 
maritime domain. This study investigated the interface between the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of 
Conduct of June 2013 and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Utilizing the Marxist Political Economy 
paradigm, the study found that the repressive measures adopted in the Code of Conduct were implicated in the 
rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea within the region. Consequently, it recommended that the key 
stakeholders, especially the Signatories to the Code of Conduct, members of the ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC, 
among others should fashion and implement an all-inclusive security policy that would address the structural and 
economic disarticulation in these littoral states which accounted for the origin and sustainment of the illicit 
maritime activities. 
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1. Introduction 
The Gulf of Guinea has remained one of the most important regions in the world. The significance of the region 
has been accentuated by the availability of high-profile strategic resources like hydrocarbon, gold, diamond and 
aquatic creatures. Similarly, the high growth potential of oil and gas, their development at sea or in coastal areas, 
the region’s proximity to European and North American markets, the ongoing tensions between the Russian 
Federation and the European Union (EU) member-states, the political instability in the Middle East and the 
growing demand for fossil fuels in emerging countries all contribute to the heightened geo-strategic importance 
of the Gulf of Guinea region. According to Onuoha (2012:4) “the region contains 50.4 billion barrels of proven 
reserves and it produces 5.5 million barrels of oil per day”. It is also a key hub of commercial maritime activities 
like exports of hydrocarbons and imports of manufactured goods and food items. This attests to the fact that 
international trade is critical to many African economies. With over 90 percent of foreign trade (imports and 
exports) passing through it, the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain has become the heart of the global economy. 
Nonetheless, there is growing awareness that the vast resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea are 
being undermined by multi-faceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. Rather than 
contributing to stability and economic prosperity for countries in the region, pervasive incidence of insecurity in 
this resource-laden maritime domain has resulted in more than US$2 billion in annual financial losses, 
significantly constrained investment and economic prospects, growing crime and potentially adverse political 
consequences (Gilpin, 2007). The expansion of organised crime and terrorism in the region has also generated 
concern within the international community. Some of these transnational organized crimes in the Gulf of Guinea 
maritime domain as highlighted in Article 1 (5) of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of 
Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa otherwise referred 
to as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct for short include but not limited to the following acts when committed at sea:  
money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering, crude 
oil theft, human trafficking, human smuggling, maritime pollution, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, illegal dumping of toxic waste, maritime terrorism and hostage taking and vandalisation of offshore oil 
infrastructure. 
Particularly growing in nature, intensity and frequency of these maritime criminalities are piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. Although these acts are frequently manifested at sea, their origins are land-based. 
Recorded piracy attacks in 2012 extended from Guinea in the west to Angola in the south. Partly due to the 
significant decrease in piracy off the coast of Somalia as a consequence of massive deployment of international 
naval forces, the Gulf of Guinea region became one of the most severely affected regions in the world in 2012, 
with 62 documented attacks on shipping. In total, 207 sailors were taken hostage. Most attacks took place in the 
waters of Togo and Nigeria with the latter recording 31 attacks in 2013 alone (ICC International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) Annual Report, 2013; Tull, 2014). Table I below contains details on the trends of actual and 
attempted attacks against ships in the Gulf of Guinea. 
Arguably, the Gulf of Guinea region has emerged the most dangerous maritime zone in Africa. IMB 
recognizes the region as one of the three major areas that suffer from piracy; others being the Gulf of Aden and 
South East Asia. The prevalence of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the zone is a major regional 
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problem that is increasingly compromising the development of its geo-strategic economic resources. The menace 
has threatened maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal states in the long term. According to 
Bridger (2013), as many as 60% of piracy activities in the region go unreported due to the shipping companies’ 
attempt to prevent increased insurance premiums. However, between 2007 and 2011, there were an estimated 
150 cases of maritime piracy to the east of the Niger Delta, mainly off the Cameroonian coast (International 
Crisis Group, 2012). Also, there were 45 and 64 incidents of actual and attempted attacks against ships in the 
Gulf of Guinea by 2010 and 2011 respectively, and by the end of 2012, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea had 
launched around 100 attacks (Baldauf, 2012). Moreover, the 2014 IMB Q2 Report indicates that there were 73 
incidents in 2013 and 38 in the first half of 2014. 
In problematizing the implication of the repressive measures adopted in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct 
of June 2013 vis-à-vis the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea, this study found that extant literature 
is generally patchy. In other words, no systematic research effort has been wholly committed to unravelling the 
overall implication of the exclusively repressive focus of the Code of Conduct on the increasing rate of piracy 
and sea banditry in the Gulf of Guinea. Some of these studies include: International Crisis Group (2012), Onuoha 
(2012), Ukeje & Ela (2013), Gottlieb (2014), Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth (2014), Mejia (2012) and Okai (2014). 
While Onuoha (2012) and International Crisis Group (2012) examined the role of inter-regional collaboration in 
the mitigation of piracy and other illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea, their recommendations lack 
the capacity to arrest the structural underpinnings of maritime insecurity in the region. On the other hand, Ukeje 
& Ela (2013) identified the rigid attachment of the Gulf of Guinea coastal states to their sovereignty as a threat to 
the achievement of maritime security and safety in the region as envisaged by the Code of Conduct. Other 
studies, especially Gottlieb (2014) and Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth (2014), tend to argue that the implementation of 
the exclusively repressive declarations, especially the Code of Conduct, accounts for the marginal reduction in 
the incidences of piracy and sea robbery in the region. However, it must be noted that this measure lacks the 
capacity to ensure maritime safety and security on a sustainable basis in the region. On the other hand, Okai 
(2014) did not define any role for the Gulf of Guinea coastal states. He rather emphasized the need to employ the 
SECLOMTS model of the AFRICOM as the panacea for bridging the institutional capacity gap in the region 
effectively. Lastly, Mejia (2012) locates his analysis of piracy and other illicit maritime activities within Somalia 
and the Gulf of Aden coastlines. The report which examines the interface between piracy and the concept of 
failed states holds that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Somali piracy phenomenon can trace its 
roots to the plunder of Somalia’s fishery resources, dumping of toxic wastes off its coast and the absence of an 
effective government. However, this is an insufficient explanation for the rising spate of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain that is dominated by relatively stable governments like 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, Benin, among others. 
Generally, the extant literature conceptualized security to conform to its traditional realist identification 
with two broad characteristics. First, security has been associated with the perpetuation of a regime and not 
necessarily the welfare of a country and its inhabitants. Second, the focus has been primarily land-centric 
because regime security has seldom had a maritime dimension. Consequently, maritime security arrangements in 
the Gulf of Guinea are under-resourced and have received scant policy attention. As a corollary, the exclusively 
security-policy and repressive focus of the Code of Conduct has precluded the adoption of structural solution to 
the problem. Moreover, the strategic approaches for the eradication of these illicit activities in the region as 
recommended in these studies merely promote knee-jerk responses to maritime insecurity. Consequently, they 
ignore the structural and economic causes of piracy, which arise from the subjection of largely young 
populations to unbridled exploitation, uneven distribution of resource wealth, corruption and social exclusionism. 
It is against this background that this study analyzes the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 
2013 and the control of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Hence, a critical investigation of the 
implementation of the relevant articles of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 vis-à-vis the worsening 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea within the region has necessitated the enunciation of the following 
research question: Are the repressive measures adopted in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 implicated in 
the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea? 
The paper is divided into the following: introduction, theoretical framework of analysis, background to 
the introduction of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, the repressive focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and 
insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework of Analysis 
This study employs the Marxist Political Economy paradigm as a tool for analyzing the interface between the 
repressive focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 and the rising spate of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. The Marxist paradigmatic orientation arose as a counterpoise to the 
dominant bourgeois political economy which was expounded and popularized by Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo in the 18th century. This paradigmatic prism is propounded in Marx (1984), Marx (1967) and Marx 
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(1977) but extrapolated and expanded in Ake (1981), Nikitin (1983), Ihovbere (1985), Akpuru-Aja (1998), 
among others. 
The political economy approach is essentially based on dialectical materialism. The theory of dialectical 
materialism emphasizes the primacy of material condition, the dynamic character of social reality and the 
relatedness of different elements of society (Ake 1981). The theory is premised on the notion that man is 
principally motivated by economic or material needs. Labour is the essence of material existence, hence, 
economic activity is man’s primary concern. According to Akpuru-Aja (1998:16), “the thrust of this perspective 
is that the understanding of a society’s politics and culture depends primarily on the understanding of its 
economic structure as defined by the relations between employers of labour and the working class in the process 
of production”. To Marx, every political system corresponds to and reflects its kind of economic structure. Thus, 
in the Preface to his work: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx places premium on the 
sub-structural component of the society (otherwise called the base or foundation) which plays a determinant role 
on its super-structural counterparts like politics, ideology and culture of society. Accordingly, he asserts that: 
neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by 
themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, 
but that on the contrary, they originate in the material conditions of life...in the 
social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, 
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to 
a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The 
totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life (Marx, 1984:20-21). 
Thus, from the substructure, one easily understands the nature of internal relations, how a society 
organizes, manages and reproduces itself, the causes of tension, conflicts or contradictions in any given society 
as well as the direction of social change. Marx holds that the primary cause of tension and other social 
dislocation in a society is economic factor. He first employed the political economy approach for analyzing the 
root causes of conflicts and contradictions in the English capitalist economy. Corroborating the above argument, 
Akpuru-Aja (1998:17) asserts that “if one understands the economic structure of a society, the relations between 
the people in production process, it is easier to understand the nature of politics, culture, national security, socio-
psychological consciousness, ideological inclinations”. 
In relation to the study, the escalation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, the 
economic fragility of the littoral states who are Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, and by implication, 
their weak enforcement capacity of counter-piracy and armed robbery against ships operations, among others, 
can be best articulated within the analytic purview of the Marxist Political Economy approach. The approach 
also enables us to explain the failure of the coastal states to effectively manage the industries that partly or fully 
operate at sea, guarantee the socio-economic well-being of coastal communities and enforce the relevant articles 
of the Code of Conduct in territorial or international waters. Consequently, pirates and sea bandits now thrive in 
the area. The ongoing criminality is not only deeply rooted in the mismanagement of economic resources by the 
coastal states but largely symptomatic of profound and complex governance problems in the region. 
The prevalence of bad governance in these states has underpinned illegal maritime activities in the 
region. Despite their vast oil endowments, most of the Signatories parade worst indices of human development 
such as high rate of unemployment and low standard of living. With declining opportunities for legitimate 
livelihood amidst affluence, some youths in the region are easily recruited for violent conflicts or take to piracy 
and other illicit activities for survival. The case of resource-conflicts in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region and 
Angola’s Cabinda region arising from bad governance are quite archetypical. Although blighted by dearth of 
economic resources, the repressive focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct has accentuated the imperativeness of 
expending the largely meagre resources at the disposal of the Signatories on the procurement of equipment and 
training of naval personnel. The resultant effect of this state of affair is the unprecedented diversion of scarce 
capital in the budget for the procurement of sophisticated military hardware, thereby denying capital projects in 
education, health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention (Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2014). 
Following this analytic tradition, the repressive focus of the Code of Conduct is a mere reflection of the 
overwhelming dominance of the mainstream realist, militaristic and state-centric interpretation and 
understanding of national, regional and global security. This orthodox scholarship which has dominated the 
international system evolved from the Westphalia state system after 1648. Thus, the scholarship conceptualizes 
national security purely as politico-military phenomenon. 
The emphasis on repression as provided in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Code of Conduct is evident in the 
flurry of cross-border and regional naval acquisitions, emphasis on international naval training and assistance 
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programmes, increased naval interventions in pirate attacks, heightened naval patrols and vessel security 
measures, employment of local armed security, use of extra-watch duty, reinforcement of ship’s self-defence and 
use of citadel safe rooms. It is not surprising that piracy and armed robbery at sea are brewing in the region 
largely because of the non-committal disposition of the Signatories to eradicate the underlying structural defects 
that underpin and sustain these illicit activities. Therefore, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 2013, like 
several other regional/trans-boundary arrangements, is destined to collapse because of the repressive focus of the 
relevant provisions of the document. As a result of the foregoing, the incidences of piracy and sea banditry have 
not abated as reported in the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Q2-2014 Abridged Report and NYA 
International Q2-2014 Piracy Assessment Report, among others. 
 
3. Background to the Adoption of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 
Although maritime organizations, especially the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have followed the 
illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea for years, the United Nations (UN) placed a central focus on the 
issue following appeals from the President of Benin, Thomas Boni Yayi, for assistance in combating 
transnational maritime crimes in the region. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had earlier adopted 
Resolutions 2018 and 2039 in October 2011 and February 2012 respectively which, among other things, 
encouraged states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to fashion a comprehensive 
strategy through the development of domestic laws and regulations, where these are not in place, criminalizing 
piracy and armed robbery at sea; the development of a regional framework to counter piracy and armed robbery 
at sea, including information-sharing and operational coordination mechanisms in the region; and the 
development and strengthening of domestic laws and regulations, as appropriate, to implement relevant 
international agreements addressing the safety and security of navigation, in accordance with international law 
(Phillips, 2012; the Yaoundé Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against 
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, 2013). 
Consequent upon the adoption of these resolutions, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC member-states 
convened the Cotonou Joint Ministerial Conference on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea held in March 
2013 to draft a regional strategy. The Cotonou Conference paved way for the historic June 24 and 25, 2013 
Summit in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The summit with the theme: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea brought 
together twenty-five countries from the Gulf of Guinea to formalize the adoption of an integrated response to a 
comprehensive security challenge in the region. The documents drafted during the Cotonou Conference were 
endorsed at the Yaoundé Summit and became known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct Concerning the 
Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa 
otherwise known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 2013. Other ancillary documents that were adopted 
during the summit included the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African 
States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain and a Memorandum of 
Understanding among the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West 
Africa (Ukeje & Ela, 2013; Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth, 2014). 
The 15-paged 21 Articles Code of Conduct which entered into force upon signature by two or more 
signatories recognised the African Union Commission (AUC) as its depository in Article 20 (2) and (4). The 
Code of Conduct is borne out of the need to step up the continent’s strategic approach towards maritime safety 
and security. It is part of the increasing commitment of African leaders to express political will and set the 
leadership tone in the governance of Africa’s maritime domain. Accordingly, Article 2 (1) (a) of the Code of 
Conduct among other things states that the Signatories intend to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other 
illegal activities at sea. Other relevant provisions of the Code of Conduct which are indispensable to this study 
are Articles 6 & 7 which provide for Measures to Repress Piracy and Measures to Repress Armed Robbery 
Against Ships respectively. As outlined in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (2013:8), the provisions of these articles 
state as follow: 
Article 6: Measures to Repress Piracy  
1. Consistent with Article 2, each Signatory to the fullest possible extent intends to cooperate in:  
(a) arresting, investigating and prosecuting persons who have committed piracy or are reasonably suspected of 
committing piracy; 
(b) seizing pirate ships and/or aircraft and the property on board such ships and/or aircraft; and 
(c) rescuing ships, persons, and property subject to piracy. 
2. Any Signatory may seize a pirate ship beyond the outer limit of any State’s territorial sea, and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board. 
3. Any pursuit of a ship, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaged in piracy, 
extending in and over the territorial sea of a Signatory is subject to the authority of that Signatory. No Signatory 
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should pursue such a ship in or over the territory or territorial sea of any coastal State without the permission of 
that State. 
4. Consistent with international law, the courts of the Signatory which carries out a seizure pursuant to paragraph 
4 may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the 
ship or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. 
5. The Signatory which carried out the seizure pursuant to paragraph 4 may, subject to its national laws, and in 
consultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize any other 
Signatory to enforce its laws against the ship and/or persons on board. 
6. Unless otherwise arranged by the affected Signatories, any seizure made in the territorial sea of a Signatory 
pursuant to paragraph 5 should be subject to the jurisdiction of that Signatory. 
7. The Signatories intend to encourage states, ship owners and ship operators, as deemed appropriate, to take 
measures to protect against pirates, taking into international conventions, codes, standards and recommended 
practices and in particular, the recommendations adopted by IMO. 
Article 7: Measures to Repress Armed Robbery against Ships  
1. The Signatories intend for operations to suppress armed robbery against ships in the territorial sea and 
airspace of a Signatory to be subject to the authority of that Signatory, including in the case of hot pursuit from 
that Signatory’s territorial sea or archipelagic waters in accordance with UNCLOS. 
2. The Signatories intend for their respective focal points and Centres (as designated pursuant to Article 8) to 
communicate expeditiously alerts, reports, and information related to armed robbery against ships to other 
Signatories and interested parties 
Lending his voice to the desirability of a more effective regional effort against piracy and other illegal 
maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea, the Cameroonian President, Paul Biya, in an opening speech during the 
Yaoundé Summit noted inter alia: 
Gulf of Guinea countries are witnessing a boom, with a strong economic growth, 
a well-educated élite, a young population aware of the stakes. But our 
determination, our national and regional capacities, as well as our efforts to 
eradicate piracy seem inadequate to prevent or effectively stamp out the threat. 
Therefore, collective effort is a must, for us to avoid a situation where, once 
eliminated in one country or area of the Gulf of Guinea, this scourge would rear 
its head in another...I must underscore the need for a holistic approach to piracy. 
This would help us come up with innovative solutions, commensurate with the 
context and scale of this scourge for states of the region and for the international 
community (Biya, 2013: 5). 
At this point, it must be emphasized that prior to the adoption and implementation of the Yaoundé Code 
of Conduct of 2013, the Gulf of Guinea States had taken several initiatives towards combating piracy and other 
associated trans-boundary maritime criminalities within the region. In his study, Onuoha (2012) noted that the 
high incidents of piracy and other maritime crimes in the region have prompted several national, bilateral, 
regional and extra-regional engagements to improve maritime security. At the national level, the Nigerian 
Government in January 2012 transformed its Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope, which was initially 
established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta into an expanded maritime security framework, known as 
Operation Pulo Shield. Some other Gulf of Guinea States like Republics of Benin and Ghana also adopted 
measures in the form of increased policing, provision of detection and surveillance systems, creation of Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities and acquisition of requisite platforms to suppress piracy. Bilaterally, the 
Governments of Nigeria and Benin Republic in October 2011 set up a combined maritime patrol of their waters 
code-named Operation Prosperity. Efforts were also made to expand the operation in order to include the 
Ghanaian and Togolese navies, in a bid to increase the span of surveillance and eliminate maritime threats. Most 
importantly, regional measures to improve maritime security have come in the form of joint training exercises 
among navies of the Gulf of Guinea States. As reported in Onuoha (2012), in February 2012, the Nigeria Navy 
hosted Exercise Obangame Express: an annual naval exercise of Africa, US and Europe. The maritime 
interdiction exercise attended by 12 nations– Nigeria, United States, France, Italy, Spain, Cameroun, Ghana, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo, Benin Republic and Republic of Congo– was aimed at 
enhancing the response capabilities of navies in the region. The idea was to encourage countries in the region to 
improve on interoperability of communications and sharing MDA information to collectively combat piracy and 
other maritime crimes. 
 
4. The Repressive Focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea 
It is pertinent to note from the outset that piracy and armed robbery at sea are often misunderstood and even 
interchanged by some writers. Academics tend to discuss the definition of piracy ad infinitum. “It is”, according 
to Murphy (2009:7), “a slippery concept that defies accurate and incontestable definition”. For instance, there is 
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a definition under the Law of the Sea Convention, a marine insurance definition, domestic law definitions, a 
customary international law definition, among others. However, for purposes of this exercise, the study shall rely 
exclusively on the conceptual lucidity of the word “piracy” as contained in Article 101 of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which is also reproduced in Article 1 (3) of the Yaoundé Code 
of Conduct of June 25, 2013. According to the document, piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) Any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed― (i) On the high seas, against another 
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons 
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation 
of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a private ship or aircraft; (c) Any act of inciting or of 
intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b). 
In the same vein, the 2013 Annual IMB Piracy Report quoting the IMO defines Armed Robbery in 
Resolution A. 1025 (26) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships to mean any of the following acts: 
(a) Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of 
piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship 
within a state’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; (b) Any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described above. 
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is the culmination of initiatives directed towards stronger trans-boundary 
and inter-regional cooperation in combating piracy and other incidents of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of 
Guinea.  Among other things, the Code of Conduct reiterated its concern about the serious threats posed by 
piracy, armed robbery at sea and other illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea. However, attacks off the 
coast of Gulf of Guinea constitute a fair share of the high incidents of piracy recorded in Africa. According to 
Onuoha (2012:5), “the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 427 of the 1434 attacks in African waters between 2003 and 
2011”. The pirates are known to be violent, as they usually deploy sophisticated arms and weapons like AK-47s. 
The traditional modus operandi of pirates operating in the region has largely involved the use of speedboats to 
attack and dispossess shipping crew of cash, cargo and other valuables when the vessel is at anchor or in harbour. 
Moreover, the UNSC Report of (2013), shows that the incidents of piracy and related criminal activities have 
risen significantly, making the region the second most dangerous piracy zone on the African continent. The 
report indicates that a total of 58 attacks were reported in the region during the first 10 months of 2011, which 
was an increase from the 45 attacks recorded in 2010. Twenty-one of the reported attacks in 2011 occurred off 
the coast of Benin, 14 off the coast of Nigeria, 7 off the coast of Togo, 4 off the coasts of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 2 off the coast of Ghana and 1 off the coasts of Angola and Côte d’Ivoire. In 2010, Nigeria 
reported 25 attacks, Guinea 6, Cameroon 5, Côte d’Ivoire 4, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 3, and Congo 
and Liberia 1 respectively. A more comprehensive and updated report of the trend of actual and attempted pirate 
and armed robbery attacks in the region is found in Tables I & II below. 
It will amount to fallacy of over-generalization to conclude that the implementation of the Yaoundé 
Code of Conduct of June 2013 has not recorded any impact on the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea in the Gulf of Guinea. While maritime security has traditionally been a low priority for Gulf of Guinea armed 
forces, the spread of piracy from Nigeria and its associated economic losses have prompted a flurry of cross-
border and regional naval acquisitions and international training and assistance programmes. There was an 
increase in naval interventions in pirate attacks in later part of 2013, with Nigerian, Togolese and visiting French 
naval forces all intercepting would-be tanker hijackings. Heightened naval patrols and vessel security measures 
showed some successes, as both the number of tanker attacks and successful hijackings declined from a 2011 
high (Bridger, 2014). Similarly, regional states have concentrated some degree of naval resources to implement 
safe zones around pirate-prone anchorages off Benin, Togo and Nigeria. Vessel security and situational 
awareness also improved as revised best management practices— such as the employment of local armed 
security, extra watch duty and the use of “citadel” safe rooms— become more widely applied (Bridger, 2014). 
Thus, prior to the seizure of Kerala, there had not been a successful tanker hijacking reported in the Gulf of 
Guinea for over five months. 
Although a combination of stronger patrolling and a reinforcement of ships’ self-defence, among others, 
have proved effective, these measures are not addressing the root causes of the problem. As pointed out earlier, 
the exclusive security policy and repressive focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as expressed in its Articles 6, 
7 & 8 has largely clogged the counter-piracy and armed robbery at sea campaign in the Gulf of Guinea. The 
economic disarticulation and exclusionism in these societies, which are mere manifestations of the entrenched 
bad/poor governance, entail that the repressive approach cannot address the problem on a sustainable basis.  
Indeed, while combined naval efforts have created a safe corridor for ships through the Gulf of Aden, pirates 
have responded by launching more attacks further offshore, in particular on oil tankers towards the Gulf and 
Middle East. This experience bears important lessons and warnings for the key stakeholders within the Gulf of 
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Guinea maritime domain. Hence, acts of piracy, sea robbery and other associated maritime crimes had since 
proliferated as captured in Table I below. 
Arising from the foregoing, therefore, it is pertinent to emphasize that the attainment of security and 
stability in the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain is largely dependent on the security of human persons. 
Unfortunately, many communities in the region suffer from chronic insecurity in their daily lives. The prevalence 
of underdeveloped and undiversified economies has created an over-reliance on subsistence agriculture, which 
leaves many communities working for survival rather than growth. Some of these countries, especially Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Niger, have some of the lowest or worst indices of human development. In the same vein, 
rate of access to electricity, healthcare, sanitation, and public services is generally low. Lack of education has 
also resulted in low literacy rates, constrained skills development and stunted the expansion of infrastructure. 
These have resulted in lack of employment opportunities and uncertainty of livelihoods. The youth populations 
of many of the countries in the region are left with few opportunities for gainful employment, thereby providing 
a fertile recruiting ground for insurgent groups and criminal networks who offer work, financial incentives, 
status and in some cases, basic services and protection to individuals and communities in need —effectively 
replacing the state. In the light of the foregoing, it would be totally incorrect to rely exclusively on repressive 
approach as a remedy for the menace of piracy, sea banditry and other associated crimes in the region. 
As shown in Tables I & II below, actual and attempted piracy and armed robbery at sea attacks in the 
Gulf of Guinea have not been evenly distributed. The incidents of piracy in the region decreased from 64 attacks 
in 2003 to 56 in 2004 and 25 in 2005. It increased from 31 in 2006 to 53 in 2007 and 59 in 2008. Although it 
declined from 48 in 2009 to 39 in 2010, it picked up again with 53 cases recorded in 2011, 62 in 2012, 73 in 
2013 and 38 in the first half of 2014. The majority (55 percent) of the attacks recorded between 2003 and 2013 
occurred in Nigerian waters. Between 2003 and 2005, there was a decline in the number of attacks in Nigerian 
waters, and overall in the Gulf of Guinea. However, there was an increase in the number of attacks between 2007 
and 2008. The upsurge was mostly because of the ferocious agitation of the oil-rich Niger Delta militants against 
perceived exclusion of the region by successive governments as well as the environmental criminality 
perpetrated by foreign oil companies. The operational tactics of the militant groups included hostage-taking of 
oil workers, sabotage of oil facilities, attacks on oil vessels, illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping and ransom 
receipts, among others. 
Moreover, available reports from credible maritime-related organizations like the IMB Q2-2014 
Abridged Report and NYA International Q2-2014 Piracy Assessment Report as well as other independent 
reporters indicate that since the adoption and implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, piracy and sea 
robbery had not abated. As shown in Table I, some of the major attacks include criminal boarding of an anchored 
general cargo ship by two robbers in a speedboat on June 30, 2013; hijacking of the 75,000-ton Greek-owned 
vessel, the MT Kerala, off the coast of Angola by a sophisticated pirate gang on January 18, 2014; hijacking and 
boarding of Medallion Reedererei-owned tanker SP Brussels underway in West of Beyelsa by two armed pirates 
on April 29, 2014; criminal boarding of China Spirit, a berthed bulk carrier, in Freetown Port, Sierra Leone by 
five robbers armed with knives in a boat on May 05, 2014; hijacking  of Fair Artemis with 24 crew members on 
board with operator on approximately 40NM south of Accra, Ghana on June 04, 2014; hijacking of a fishing 
vessel, Marine 711 by pirates on June 05, 2014; the disappearance of a Liberia-flagged MT Fair Artemis (Greek 
oil tanker) in the pirate-infested Gulf of Guinea on June 09, 2014; attacking of a patrol of the Joint Task Force in 
Robot Creek, Nembe Local Government Area of Bayelsa State, by approximately 30 armed robbers in two 
speedboats on June 24, 2014; interception and hijacking of two passenger boats in Zion community of Southern 
Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State by gunmen on June 28, 2014; criminal boarding of an anchored 
general cargo ship near position 05:12.5N - 004:03.8W, Abidjan Anchorage by two pirates, in a speedboat on 
June 30, 2014; attack on a passenger boat on the Ogbia-Nembe in Bayelsa State on July 20,2014; attack of an oil 
rig in Gbarain, in  Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State on July 23, 2014, among others. 
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Table I: Timeline of Selected Piracy and Armed Robbery Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea 
S/N Date Event Victim(s)/Consequences Sources 
1 Jan. 4, 2009 Pirates hijacked the French ship Bourbon Leda Five Nigerians, two Ghanaians, one 
Cameroonian and one Indonesian who were 
on board. It was freed Jan. 7 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy_in_the_Gulf_of_Guinea on 15th Aug., 2014. 
2 Jan. 21, 2009 Gunmen attack the diesel tanker MT Meredith Kidnapped a Romanian, who was released a 
day later 
Tattersall (2009), Retrieved from 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE50K06D20090121 on 15th 
August, 2014. 
3 Jan. 23, 2009 Rebels steal some items from the Exxon tanker 
MV Ngoni. They also seized a tugboat 
 http://tradenewswire.blogspot.com/2013/12/nigeria-step-up-fight-against-
sea.html Retrieved on 15th Aug, 2014. 
4 April 21, 2009 Rebels attacked the Turkish ship Ilena Mercan Kidnapped two crewmen http://dalje.com/en-world/gunmen-attack-nigeria-oil-tanker-two-
kidnapped/252530 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
5 Nov. 24, 2009 Pirates hijacked the Liberian-flagged Cancale 
Star off Benin 
Killed a Ukrainian officer before robbing 
the ship 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8376715.stm Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
6 Dec. 1, 2009 The Ghanaian Navy intercepted the hijacked 
oil tanker African Prince a week after it had 
been taken 
The pirates escaped but had earlier killed 
the ship's chef 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8389284.stm Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
7 Mar. 13, 2010 A Chinese fishing vessel was hijacked off the 
Bakassi Peninsula, Cameroon 
Seven fishermen were abducted but later 
released with the vessel on March 18 after 
the payment of ransom. 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE62C1P020100313 Retrieved on 
15th Aug., 2014. 
8 Sept. 23, 2010 Hijacking of a vessel belonging to the company 
Bourbon off the Nigerian coast 
Three Frenchmen were kidnapped from the 
vessel 
http://english.cri.cn/6966/2010/09/22/45s595868.htm Retrieved on 15th Aug., 
2014. 
9 Aug. 3, 2011 Two Panamanian-flagged tankers were 
attacked off Benin’s coast 
The ships were not taken Elijah (2011). http://af.reuters.com/ 
article/energyOilNews/idAFL6E7J32DM20110803 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
10 Aug. 19, 2012 A British-owned oil tanker was hijacked in the 
Port of Togo 
 http://ngex.com/news/public/article.php?ArticleID=2416 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 
2014. 
11 Aug. 28, 2012 A Greek-owned oil tanker was hijacked in the 
Port of Togo 
 http://gcaptain.com/pirates-hijack-oil-tanker-togo/ Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
12 Sept. 4, 2012 A Singaporean-flagged oil tanker, the MT Abu 
Dhabi Star, was hijacked off the coast of Lagos 
The pirates fled as soon as they realized a 
Nigerian naval ship was approaching 
http://www.seanews.com.tr/search/?s_keyword=Abu%20Dhabi%20Star 
Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
13 Oct. 15, 2012 Hijacking of a Luxembourgish-flagged anchor 
handling vessel named AHT Bourbon Liberty 
249, off the coast of Nigeria 
Liberation of the 7 abducted crew members http://issuu.com/pml01/docs/280213 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
14 Dec. 23, 2012 An Italian-registered ship was hijacked by 
seven Nigerian pirates, off the coast of Bayelsa 
State 
Pirates released the ship with most of the 
crew, but took three Italians and a 
Ukrainian as hostages 
http://ngex.com/news/public/article.php?ArticleID=2416 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 
2014. 
15 Jan. 16, 2013 A Panamanian-flagged vessel, ITRI owned by 
Koda Maritime, was hijacked while 
transferring 5,000 tons of oil near Abidjan 
 http://ngex.com/news/public/article.php?ArticleID=2416 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 
2014. 
16 Feb. 3, 2013 A Luxembourgish-flagged oil tanker, 
Gascogne (owned by France) was hijacked 
approximately 70 nautical miles south of the 
port city of Abidjan 
 http://issuu.com/pml01/docs/280213 Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
17 Feb. 4, 2013 A Marshall Islands-flagged chemical tanker, 
Pyxis Delta (owned by the UAE), was hijacked 
off the coast of Nigeria 
A Filipino crew-member was killed during 
the hijacking 
http://old.nationaldailyng.com/point-blank/point-blank-43139/6976-piracy-in-
the-gulf-of-guinea-africom-and-this-dangerous-ahoy Retrieved on 15th Aug., 
2014. 
18 Feb. 11, 2013 A UK-flagged cargo ship, Ester C, (owned by 
the Isle of Wight-based Carisbrooke Shipping) 
was hijacked by pirates between the 
Cameroonian port of Douala and the port of 
Malabo in Equatorial Guinea 
Three crewmen were taken hostage after 
pirates attacked the ship 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-21409734 Retrieved on 15th 
Aug., 2014. 
19 April 16, 2013 A Greek-flagged crude oil carrier, Cap 
Theodora, was attacked by pirates 36 nautical 
miles off the coast of Principe Island 
The ship thwarted the attack by increasing 
its speed and performing evasive 
manoeuvres 
http://www.handyshippingguide.com/shipping-news/bulk-freight-and-container-
shipping-interests-see-piracy-and-cargo-theft-in-west-africa-spiral_4544 
Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
20 May 25, 2013 A Nigerian-flagged oil products tanker, MT 
Matrix, was hijacked approximately 40 nautical 
miles off the coast of Bayelsa State 
There were 12 Pakistani and five Nigerian 
crew aboard the vessel when it was 
attacked, one of the sources said. 
http://logbaby.com/news/pirates-hijack-oil-tanker--abduct-12-pakistanis--five-
nigerians_17364.html Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
21 June 30, 2013 Criminal Boarding: Two robbers in a 
Speedboat with long knives approached and 
boarded an anchored general cargo ship. 
 
The robbers escaped with stolen ship’s 
stores in their boat. All crew mustered and a 
search was carried out throughout the ship. 
http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
22 Jan. 18, 2014 A  sophisticated pirate gang hijacked the 
75,000-ton Greek-owned vessel, the MT 
Kerala, off the coast of Angola 
More than a week later and 1,300 miles 
away, the hijackers released Kerala off the 
coast of Nigeria, after offloading 12,270 
tons of its diesel cargo to other ships 
Bridger (2014). Retrieved from http:// news.usni.org/2014/03/10/piracy-gulf-
guinea-oil-soaked-pirates on 16th July, 2014. 
23 April 29, 2014 Hijacking: Two armed pirates boarded 
Medallion Reedererei-owned  SP Brussels 
underway in West of Beyelsa, Nigeria 
The crew retreated into the citadel. Head 
count in the citadel indicated two crew 
missing 
http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
24 May 05, 2014 Criminal Boarding: Five robbers armed with 
knives in a boat approached China Spirit, a 
berthed bulk carrier, in Freetown Port, Sierra 
Leone 
 
Two robbers boarded the ship and took 
hostage the duty cadet on rounds 
http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
25 June 04, 2014 Hijacking: The vessel Fair Artemis with 24 
crew members on board and was transporting 
gasoil lost contact with operator on 
approximately 40NM south of Accra, Ghana. 
The vessel was missing until 6th June when 
it was reported that it was hijacked and 
looted in Togolese waters. Pirates released 
the vessel after a week and had stolen the 
cargo. 
http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
26 June 05, 2014 Pirates hijacked a fishing vessel, MARINE 711 41 crew members were held hostage. http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
27 June 9, 2014 A Liberia-flagged MT Fair Artemis (Greek oil 
tanker) vanished in the pirate-infested Gulf of 
Guinea reportedly moved from Ghanaian to 
Togolese waters 
 http://africacenter.org/2014/06/media-review-for-june-9-
2014/#sthash.BhzxO9Px.dpuf on 15th Aug., 2014. 
28 June 24, 2014 Approximately 30 armed robbers in two 
speedboats attacked a patrol of the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) in Robot Creek, Nembe Local 
Government Area of Bayelsa State, Nigeria.  
Three suspected pirates died and one 
soldier was also killed. Two boat operators 
were injured. 
http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
29 June 28, 2014 Gunmen intercepted and hijacked two 
passenger boats in Zion community of 
Southern Ijaw Local Government Area, 
Bayelsa State 
Several passengers were abducted. http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
30 June 30, 2013 Criminal Boarding: Two robbers in a 
Speedboat with long knives approached and 
boarded an anchored general cargo ship. 
 
The robbers escaped with stolen ship’s 
stores in their boat. All crew mustered and a 
search was carried out throughout the ship. 
http://www.nyainternational.com/downloads/email/Q2-2014-Piracy-Assessment-
West-Africa.pdf Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
31 June 30, 2014 Two robbers, armed with long knives, in a 
speedboat boarded an anchored general cargo 
ship near position 05:12.5N - 004:03.8W, 
Abidjan Anchorage. 
The robbers escaped with stolen ship’s 
stores in their boat. 
 
http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/piracy/pdf/20140723_WTS.pdf 
Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
32 July 20, 2014 Pirates attacked a passenger boat on the Ogbia-
Nembe in Bayelsa State 
They killed two persons and stole cash and 
valuables from boat passengers. 
http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/piracy/pdf/20140723_WTS.pdf 
Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
33 July 23, 2014 Armed criminals attacked an oil rig in Gbarain, 
in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of 
Bayelsa State 
Five attackers were killed while two 
policemen were said to have sustained 
minor injuries. 
http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/piracy/pdf/20140723_WTS.pdf 
Retrieved on 15th Aug., 2014. 
Source: Compiled by the Researchers 
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Table II: Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in Selected States in the Gulf of Guinea,2003−2014* 
Africa 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* Total 
Angola 3 _ _ 4 1 2 _ _ 1 _ _ 2 13 
Benin 1 _ _ _ _ _ 1 _ 20 2 7 _ 32 
Cameroon 2 4 2 1 _ 2 3 5 _ 1 5 5 30 
Congo DR _ _ _ 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 _ _ 19 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
_ _ _ _ _ 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 
Ghana 3 5 3 3 1 7 3 _ 2 2 2 2 33 
Guinea 4 5 1 4 2 _ 5 6 5 3 3 _ 38 
Guinea 
Bissau 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 1 _ _ _ _ _ 1 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
2 4 3 1 _ 3 2 4 1 5 4 1 30 
Liberia 1 2 _ _ 1 1 _ 1 _ _ _ 1 7 
Nigeria 39 28 16 12 42 40 29 19 10 27 35 18 315 
Senegal 8 5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 13 
Sierra 
Leone 
_ 3 _ 2 2 _ _ _ 1 1 2 1 12 
The Congo _ _ _ _ _ 1 _ 1 3 4 3 5 17 
Togo 1 _ _ 1 _ 1 2 _ 6 15 12 3 41 
Total 64 56 25 31 53 59 48 39 53 62 73 38 602 
Source: Adapted from IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports, 2003−2014 
*The column for 2014 is for the first half of the year Besides Nigeria, other countries (as shown in 
Figure I) with high number of incidents between 2003 and 2013 include Guinea (8 percent), Ghana (6 percent), 
Cote d’Ivoire (5 percent), and Benin (5 percent). The case of Benin is quite startling. There was only one 
incident off Benin waters in 2003, while none was recorded between 2004 and 2008. In 2011, however, Benin 
had 20 cases of pirate attacks. The upsurge in piracy off the coast of Benin is largely attributed to Nigerian 
pirates who extended their attacks further out at sea. For example, the pirates that attacked and killed one of the 
crew of the Cancale Star on 23 November 2009 were from Nigeria. The Liberia-flagged oil tanker was attacked 
some 18 nautical miles (33km) off the coast of Benin, in what is believed to be the country's first of such attack 
(Onuoha, 2012). 
Figure I: Percentage Distribution of Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea 2003-2013 
 
Source: Adapted from IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports, 2003-2013 
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5. Conclusion 
In summary, the study found that the repressive focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 has led 
to the adoption of certain militaristic measures by the Signatories to the document. Thus, national and trans-
boundary efforts aimed at the mitigation of piracy and sea banditry has now shifted emphasis to a flurry of cross-
border and regional naval acquisitions, international naval training and assistance programmes, increased naval 
interventions in pirate attacks, heightened naval patrols and vessel security measures, employment of local 
armed security, use of extra-watch duty, reinforcement of ship’s self-defence and use of citadel safe rooms. 
However, this repressive approach has been implicated in the rising spate of these illegal maritime activities in 
the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain. This is amply demonstrated through the increased occurrence of these 
trans-boundary crimes since the enunciation and enforcement of the document. While these militaristic security 
measures are quite commendable in the main, they are incapable of addressing the problems on a sustainable 
basis. This is largely because such measures are carried out at the expense of the socio-economic well-being of 
coastal communities. Consequently, this has accentuated their declining opportunities for legitimate livelihood 
amidst affluence.  Hence, some youths in the region are easily recruited for violent conflicts or take to piracy and 
other illicit activities for survival. It is, therefore, not surprising that piracy and sea banditry are brewing in the 
region because of the non-committal disposition of the Signatories to the document to eradicate the underlying 
foundational or structural defects that underpin them. 
Arising from the above findings, therefore, the study puts forward the following recommendation for 
policy implementation: the root causes of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea should 
be tackled rather than reacting to the symptoms of the malaise. Most security challenges confronting Africa have 
their origin in the progressive failure of governance and internal contradictions that serve to undermine human 
development. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 should, therefore, be repackaged in order to 
comprehensively address the various threats and challenges, especially piracy and sea robbery which bedevil 
maritime safety in the Gulf of Guinea. Any long-term measure aimed at the reduction of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea in the region must involve the implementation of poverty reduction programmes, provision of 
social safety nets and the generation of employment opportunities. These are aimed at empowering the poor and 
vulnerable, thereby making piracy and associated crimes unattractive in the region. 
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